Leonid Zhukhovitsky is a famous Russian writer and publicist. His works have been translated into 40 languages around the world. Today he shared his views on the situation in the South Caucasus with ‘GeorgiaTimes' readers.

Not much time has passed since August - yet if the Caucasian war has not been forgotten as such, it has certainly been consigned to the back burner. It is as if the zone of recent fighting has been outlined in chalk - as if to warn people to enter with caution. Occasionally politicians half-heartedly scold Georgia for its aggression or reproach Russia for its excessive reaction. It's just as in the old joke: whether he stole the fur coat, or it was stolen off him - either way, it's an unseemly incident. Essentially, the international political elite has seen through this localized Caucasian cataclysm with unusual coolness: really, the Western powers couldn't give a damn about Georgia, South Ossetia just doesn't exist for them, the path of the planned oil pipeline hasn't been cut anywhere - so is there any need to fuss about trivial matters?

I, however, think that the events that occurred on the southern portion of the Caucasus deserve some serious analysis. Any conflict in which great powers are involved in one way or another is a grenade that is capable of exploding a larger powder keg under different circumstances. Remember what trivialities gave rise to what is now called international terrorism! Thank goodness that the five-day war did not dislodge the fragile supports holding up the rickety edifice of international order. But it could have. Unfortunately, it could have.

I am not one of the enraptured supporters of our current regime, I see a multitude of mistakes in its actions and consider it my duty as a writer to speak openly about them. But what can one reproach the recently elected Russian president for in relation to the events in the Caucasus?

Did he choose the wrong course of action? But it is only possible to talk about a mistaken choice when there is something to choose from. And did Dmitry Medvedev have even the slightest possible choice?

Georgian tanks were flattening Tskhinvali, the city had been destroyed, people were dying or fleeing to the north. What should have done? Ask that the Security Council be convened? One of the Western countries would certainly have used its veto right. What else - wait for the General Assembly to be convened? But with modern-day weaponry it would only have needed three days to reduce the whole of South Ossetia to rubble. How many people would have died - five, seven, fifteen thousand? After all, eight in ten inhabitants of the republic have Russian passports. Who needs a government which is incapable of defending its own citizens? Medvedev had no option - he sent troops across the mountain range simply because he did not have any opportunity to act otherwise.

It is said that Russia's reaction was disproportional, that it would have been sufficient to force Saakashvili's soldiers back beyond South Ossetia. Why did they need to take Gori and bring their army into Poti? But an army that has not withdrawn far can regroup, reinforcements would have come from Gori, all sorts of well-wishers would have brought new weapons to Poti by sea, and the localized conflict would have developed into a prolonged war with regular firing and periodic diversions. "Forcing them into peace" - this is not particularly elegant wording, but it quite accurately reflects the essence of the situation: it was necessary to take away the red-faced Georgian leader's inclination for war at least until the end of his presidency. Many Western politicians have berated Medvedev for his brutal response to this aggression - but has anybody suggested a more sensible course of action?

I am far from regarding all Western journalists as Russophobes, who have been corrupted by some kind of dark forces. They are people like any others. It's just that they have their own ideas about the reality of the Caucasus. They are not particularly concerned about who started the aggression - they are outraged that enormous Russia brought its entire weight to bear on little Georgia. I'm afraid that they just don't realize that at the start of the war five-million strong Georgia brought its weight to bear on tiny South Ossetia with a population twenty-five times smaller...

Journalists and political analysts talk just as crudely about the Russian citizenship of the overwhelming majority of Abkhazians and South Ossetians: they say that crafty Russia practically forced their passports on them. But how did it all actually happen? After the USSR disintegrated into independent states, all inhabitants of the former Union were given the right to choose any citizenship. And how could it have been any other way? People used to move freely around the expanse of this enormous country, they would go away to study, for work, to get married. One's place of residence did not hold much importance - it could always be changed. With the emergence of strict borders, with the division of a single country into many countries people had to make an incredibly difficult choice: in one new state there was a place to live, but they spoke a foreign language; in a second the culture was familiar, but there was no work; but settling in a third would mean being cut off from one's relatives and friends.

Appearing on the ruins of the Soviet Empire, independent Georgia itself ended up as an empire with all the troubles that go with it: the autonomous republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared themselves independent straight away. This was not just a mere political whim - the separation of Georgia from Russia immediately caused extremely difficult problems for ethnic minorities. Beforehand, they were able to learn for free in Russian higher education institutions, they could be treated in Russian hospitals, they found work in Russian factories without any difficulty, played successfully in Russian sports teams. The South Ossetians were connected to their brothers from North Ossetia by a common culture and common language. And Abkhazia's modest economy was firmly tied to Russia: it was northwards that Abkhazians took flowers in the spring, and mandarins in the autumn, it was undemanding Russian holidaymakers who they rented out rooms to in the summer, and even bunks in little wooden sheds. This was what they lived off. Therefore they chose Russian citizenship because they were striving for the most fundamental thing: to transport mandarins from Pitsunda to Rostov without a visa. Unfortunately, having obtained their freedom without having to fire a single shot, the authorities in Tbilisi not only refused their small republics freedom, but even autonomous status - and hurriedly put together, essentially punitive divisions entered both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Thousands of homes were plundered, hundreds and hundreds of people were killed. Yet even so the Georgians lost these battles for a clear reason: they had somewhere to retreat to, whereas the Ossetians and Abkhazians had nowhere to go. Saakashvili learnt from the experience of previous wars: a well-armed and well-trained modern army routed Tskhinvali.

It is written that Georgia endured a heavy defeat, soldiers fled, throwing down their weapons. I wouldn't go so far as to use such categorical phrases. The Georgians are brave people, a difficult history has taught them how to fight. It's just that neither the soldiers nor the officers wanted to die for Saakashvili. It wasn't a Georgian war, rather his personal war. And he endured a personal defeat.

Just why did this carnage begin? Two recalcitrant nations decided to live independently. The authorities in Tbilisi did not give their consent. But so what? Georgia's economy did not suffer from this in any way, its culture even less so. There are many smouldering conflicts in today's world: Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Karabakh, Kurdistan and the Basque country. So the conflict by the southern spurs of the Caucasus mountains could have smouldered on without bloodshed for at least another twenty years, in practice without affecting anyone's interests, until the optimal way out appeared with time. Abkhazia could have waited, South Ossetia could have waited, Georgia could have waited. Unfortunately, Saakashvili couldn't wait. Whilst fighting to retain his post as president, he promised too much, in particular to see in the upcoming New Year in Sukhumi. He didn't manage to make the upcoming one. The next one turned out to be 2009. The proud politician really didn't want to go down in the history of his beloved homeland as a boastful liar. So he chose the perfect moment, helpfully coinciding with the start of the Beijing Olympics, for his attack on little Tskhinvali...

So what will happen now? How will it all end?

The current situation will probably become permanent. Blood that has been shed is more enduring than a border outlined by politicians. For the time being, only Russia and Nicaragua have recognized the two small countries. A few further states are likely to recognize them in the near future, if only to spite the United States.

But do the small Caucasian countries need mass recognition? They still won't pull in forty embassies, and the slightly sour Abkhazian mandarin that Russians know so well is not likely to oust the sweet Spanish one with a cool label on the side from the European markets. Of course, Psou and Lykhny are very nice wines - but in Greece, Italy, France, Hungary, even Germany, they are more than happy to drink their own wines. There's no space for either Abkhazian or the Ossetian wine in any store in the West.

Just a few years ago the principle of the inviolability of borders helped maintain stability in Europe. The decision by the Western countries to seize Kosovo from Serbia has torn the only clamping ring off the barrel. What one side does can be replicated by another. I'm afraid that a whole series of alarming surprises lie in store for us.

I am an optimist. And I hope that the Caucasian chalk circle won't exist for a lifetime. If the people in power change, then Tbilisi, Moscow, Sukhumi and Tskhinvali will realize that it is more costly for themselves to fight with their neighbours, that a common economic and cultural space is far more important than political ambitions and ethnic grievances. And then the old accounts will lose any meaning. After all, the independence of the green hill called the "state of San Marino" does not stop the Italians from sleeping easily at night, and the French are even proud of the famous casino in the independent principality of Monaco. I think that in the future, people in Tbilisi will begin to regard the sovereignty of the small republics with just as much equanimity as people in Moscow have about the independence of Georgia itself.

Leonid Zhukhovitsky